This paper describes, through a theoretical approach, the interactions between institutional lenders and local moneylenders, and how these affect the rural credit market. It evaluates the effects produced by the introduction of "spillovers" in a rural credit market with rationing in which banks and moneylenders interact simultaneously while working in distinct segments. Due to the strong and consolidated social ties, it is probable that the spread of knowledge concerning potential debtors comes about in targeted and rapid way with reduced costs for the lenders as well.
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Find related papers by JEL classification: G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Mortgages O17 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements O19 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - International Linkages to Development; Role of International Organizations
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