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Genetic Tests and Intertemporal Screening in Competitive Insurance Markets

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  • Winand Emons

Abstract

We consider successive generations of non-altruistic individuals carrying a good or bad gene. Daughters are more likely to carry their mother's gene than the opposite one. Competitive insurers can perform a genetic test revealing an agent's gene. They may condition their quotes on the agent's or on her ancestors' genetic status. In equilibrium generation one is bribed to take the test with an unconditional quote. The insurer uses this information to profitably screen a finite number of generations of their offspring. The offspring of good gene carriers subsidize the tested generation

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Paper provided by Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft in its series Diskussionsschriften with number dp0605.

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Date of creation: Dec 2006
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Handle: RePEc:ube:dpvwib:dp0605

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Keywords: genetic tests; insurance; screening; pooling;

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  1. Michael Hoel & Tor Iversen, 2001. "Genetic Testing When There is a Mix of Compulsory and Voluntary Health Insurance," CESifo Working Paper Series 495, CESifo Group Munich.
  2. Tabarrok, Alexander, 1994. "Genetic testing: An economic and contractarian analysis," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 75-91, March.
  3. Rothschild, Michael & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 90(4), pages 630-49, November.
  4. Fredrik Andersson, 2001. "Adverse selection and bilateral asymmetric information," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 74(2), pages 173-195, June.
  5. Hoy, Michael, 1982. "Categorizing Risks in the Insurance Industry," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 97(2), pages 321-36, May.
  6. Michael Hoy & Fabienne Orsi & Fran�ois Eisinger & Jean Paul Moatti, 2003. "The Impact of Genetic Testing on Healthcare Insurance," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 28(2), pages 203-221, April.
  7. Strohmenger, R. & Wambach, A., 2000. "Adverse selection and categorical discrimination in the health insurance markets: the effects of genetic tests," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 197-218, March.
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