Genetic Tests and Intertemporal Screening in Competitive Insurance Markets
AbstractWe consider successive generations of non-altruistic individuals carrying a good or bad gene. Daughters are more likely to carry their mother's gene than the opposite one. Competitive insurers can perform a genetic test revealing an agent's gene. They may condition their quotes on the agent's or on her ancestors' genetic status. In equilibrium generation one is bribed to take the test with an unconditional quote. The insurer uses this information to profitably screen a finite number of generations of their offspring. The offspring of good gene carriers subsidize the tested generation
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Date of creation: Dec 2006
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genetic tests; insurance; screening; pooling;
Other versions of this item:
- Emons Winand, 2009. "Genetic Tests and Inter-Temporal Screening in Competitive Insurance Markets," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-19, July.
- Emons, Winand, 2007. "Genetic Tests and Intertemporal Screening in Competitive Insurance Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers 6047, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-01-13 (All new papers)
- NEP-IAS-2007-01-13 (Insurance Economics)
- NEP-NEU-2007-01-13 (Neuroeconomics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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