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Replicator Dynamics with Frequency Dependent Stage Games

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Author Info
Esther Bruegger

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Abstract

We analyze evolutionary games with replicator dynamics that have frequency dependent stage games. In such an evolutionary game, the payoffs of a strategy at any point in time are functions of the strategy shares given by the players' strategy choices at that time. This framework is suited to model feedback effects between population variables and individual incentives, indirect network effects, and behavior under social norms. We show that the replicator dynamics with frequency dependent stage games is well behaved, i.e. has unique solutions and is simplex invariant for all initial strategy states. Moreover, we present an extension of Liapunov's Theorem that facilitates the analysis of evolutionary equilibria for frequency dependent evolutionary games

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Paper provided by Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft in its series Diskussionsschriften with number dp0505.

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Date of creation: Mar 2005
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Handle: RePEc:ube:dpvwib:dp0505

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Related research
Keywords: Replicator Dynamics Frequency Dependent State Dependent Evolutionary Games Liapunov

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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  1. Assar Lindbeck & Sten Nyberg & Jšrgen W. Weibull, 1999. "Social Norms And Economic Incentives In The Welfare State," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 114(1), pages 1-35, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2008-7-25.

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