On Holders, Blades and Other Tie-In Sales

This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data

On Holders, Blades and Other Tie-In Sales

Author Info

Alain Egli

Abstract

Tie-in sales have a bad image because of anti-competitive effects. Notably, tying contracts allow monopolists to carry over monopoly power into markets where they meet competition. Most of the literature assumes a firm being monopolist in one market and facing competition in another. In contrast, we analyze two firms which both are monopolists in one market and competitors in the other. Under such a symmetric structure tying has competitive effects. Tie-in sales may increase the consumers' expected utility. By tying their products, the firms insure consumers against uncertain future demand

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft in its series Diskussionsschriften with number dp0417.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: Jul 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ube:dpvwib:dp0417

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Gesellschaftsstr. 49, CH-3012 Bern
Phone: 0041 31 631 45 06
Fax: 41 31 631 39 92
Web page: http://www.vwi.unibe.ch/content/publikationen/index_eng.html
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Silvia Glusstein-Gerber).

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior
D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2004-12-12 (All new papers)
NEP-COM-2004-12-12 (Industrial Competition)
NEP-MIC-2004-12-12 (Microeconomics)

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Carbajo, Jose & de Meza, David & Seidmann, Daniel J, 1990. "A Strategic Motivation for Commodity Bundling," Journal of Industrial Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(3), pages 283-98, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Liebowitz, S J, 1983. "Tie-In Sales and Price Discrimination," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 21(3), pages 387-99, July.
Adams, William James & Yellen, Janet L, 1976. "Commodity Bundling and the Burden of Monopoly," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 90(3), pages 475-98, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? To receive notification of recent additions to the database, subscribe to the free NEP reports.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-10.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.