This paper analyses banking and borrowing of carbon emission rights within the framework of a simple, integrated assessment model. Breaking the world economy in just two regions it will be shown: (1) Increasing when-flexibility in greenhouse gas abatement through banking and borrowing of carbon emission permits has a positive effect on welfare for regions with a poor endowment in carbon emission rights, but negatively affects rich-endowed regions. (2) Intergenerational fairness advocates intertemporal flexibility in greenhouse gas abatement, irrespectively of the initial allocation of carbon rights. (3) Optimal carbon accumulation is not independent of the initial allocation of carbon rights. Different initial sharing rules clearly influence the development of atmospheric carbon concentration.
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Paper provided by Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft in its series Diskussionsschriften with number
dp0301.
Find related papers by JEL classification: Q4 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy F2 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business
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