Pure Strategies and No Externalities with Multiple Agents
AbstractThis note considers two properties of common agency models - pure strategy equilibria with simple competition are robust and equilibria in mechanisms can be reproduced as equilibria with simple competition provided an appropriate no-externalities assumption holds. This note provides counter examples to both these theorems when there are multiple agents.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Vancouver School of Economics in its series Microeconomics.ca working papers with number peters-03-12-17-12-42-59.
Length: 0 pages
Date of creation: 17 Dec 2003
Date of revision: 12 Feb 2004
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Web page: http://www.economics.ubc.ca/
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-01-18 (All new papers)
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