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Pure Strategies and No Externalities with Multiple Agents

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Author Info
Peters, Michael

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Abstract

This note considers two properties of common agency models - pure strategy equilibria with simple competition are robust and equilibria in mechanisms can be reproduced as equilibria with simple competition provided an appropriate no-externalities assumption holds. This note provides counter examples to both these theorems when there are multiple agents.

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File URL: http://montoya.econ.ubc.ca/papers/competing_mech2.pdf
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Paper provided by Microeconomics.ca Website in its series Micro Theory Working Papers with number peters-03-12-17-12-42-59.

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Length: 0 pages
Date of creation: 17 Dec 2003
Date of revision: 12 Feb 2004
Handle: RePEc:ubc:pmicro:peters-03-12-17-12-42-59

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For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Michael Peters).

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  1. McAfee, R Preston, 1993. "Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(6), pages 1281-1312, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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