Promoting Competition by Coordinating Prices: When Rivals Share Intellectual Property
AbstractThe paper examines technology agreements and the standards process from which they emerge when members supply inputs to the alliance while simultaneously competing with it. Under this overlapping ownership structure, pool members are horizontally related. I show that strategic complementarity between the downstream products owned by a member and those arising from the collaboration is sufficient for a pool to be pro-competitive. Although patent pools are more efficient than uncoordinated pricing, consumers are better off if an outside firm rather than a pool member owns the non-pool competing product. Antitrust rules facilitating efficient IP agreements under overlapping ownership and their implications for the direction of technological change are derived.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Vancouver School of Economics in its series Economics working papers with number nancy_gallini-2012-5.
Length: 56 pages
Date of creation: 07 Feb 2012
Date of revision: 07 Feb 2012
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Web page: http://www.economics.ubc.ca/
Patent Pools; Intellectual Property; Antitrust Policy;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-02-20 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2012-02-20 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-HME-2012-02-20 (Heterodox Microeconomics)
- NEP-INO-2012-02-20 (Innovation)
- NEP-IPR-2012-02-20 (Intellectual Property Rights)
- NEP-TID-2012-02-20 (Technology & Industrial Dynamics)
You can help add them by filling out this form.
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