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Retail Contracting and Costly Monitoring: Theory and Evidence

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Author Info
Lafontaine, F.
Slade, M.E.

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Abstract

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by UBC Department of Economics in its series UBC Departmental Archives with number 95-33.

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Length: 9 pages
Date of creation: 1995
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ubc:bricol:95-33

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Related research
Keywords: MORAL HAZARD;

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Cited by:
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  1. Francine Lafontaine & Emmanuel Raynaud, 2002. "The Role of Residual Claims and Self-Enforcement in Franchise Contracting," NBER Working Papers 8868, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Lewin-Solomons, S., 2000. "Innovation and Authority in Franchise Systems: An Empirical Exploration of the Plural Form," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0015, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. [Downloadable!]
  3. Francine Lafontaine & Kathryn L. Shaw, 2001. "Targeting Managerial Control: Evidence from Franchising," NBER Working Papers 8416, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Albert Guangzhou Hu, 2003. "R&D Organization, Monitoring Intensity, And Innovation Performance In Chinese Industry," Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 12(2), pages 117-144, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet, 1997. "Monitoring versus Incentives: Substitutes or Complements?," Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers 47, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal. [Downloadable!]
  6. Marianna Succurro, 2006. "An economic analysis of contracts signed between tour operators and travel agents," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 22(3), pages 199-218, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Lewin-Solomons, S.B., 2000. "The Plural Form in Franchising: A Synergism of Market and Hierarchy," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0027, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. [Downloadable!]
  8. Chu-Chia S. Lin & Ivan P.L. Png, 2002. "Monitoring Costs and the Mode of International Investment," Industrial Organization 0207012, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Affuso, L., 2000. "Intra-Firm Retail Contracting: Survey Evidence from the UK'," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0022, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. [Downloadable!]
  10. Kessler, Anke & Lülfesmann, Christoph & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "Optimal Contracting in Agency with Verifiable Ex Post Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 3428, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarree, 2000. "CATCHING THE AGENT ON THE WRONG FOOT: ex post choice of monitoring," Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington 0006, Department of Economics at the University of Washington. [Downloadable!]
  12. Lewin-Solomons, S., 2000. "Autonomy, Contractibility and the Franchise Relationship," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0016, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. [Downloadable!]
  13. Patterson, Paul M. & Richards, Timothy J., 2001. "Retail Contracting And Grower Prices," 2001 Annual meeting, August 5-8, Chicago, IL 20534, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association). [Downloadable!]
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