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Strategy-Prrof Social Choice with Continuous Saparable Preferences

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Author Info
Le Breton, M.
Weymark, J.A.

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Abstract

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by UBC Department of Economics in its series UBC Departmental Archives with number 93-29.

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Length: 41 pages
Date of creation: 1993
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ubc:bricol:93-29

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Related research
Keywords: social choice;

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Cited by:
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  1. Biung-Ghi Ju, 2005. "A Characterization of Plurality-Like Rules Based on Non-Manipulability, Restricted Efficiency, and Anonymity," WORKING PAPERS SERIES IN THEORETICAL AND APPLIED ECONOMICS 200509, University of Kansas, Department of Economics, revised Mar 2005. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Svensson, Lars-Gunnar & Torstensson, Pär, 2005. "Strategy-Proof Allocation of Multiple Public Goods," Working Papers 2005:3, Lund University, Department of Economics, revised 02 Feb 2007.
  3. John A. Weymark, 2004. "Strategy-Proofness and the Tops-Only Property," Working Papers 0409, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University, revised Sep 2006. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Le Breton, Michel & Zaporozhets, Vera, 2006. "On the Equivalence of Coalitional and Individual Strategy-Proofness Properties," IDEI Working Papers 408, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
  5. Lars-Gunnar Svensson & Pär Torstensson, 2008. "Strategy-proof allocation of multiple public goods," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 30(2), pages 181-196, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Alejandro Saporiti, 2008. "Strategy-Proofness and Single-Crossing," Wallis Working Papers WP55, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-3.

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