This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

The Leverage Theory of Tying Revisited

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Margaret E. Slade

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

I assess the private profitability of tying under circumstances where the standard efficiency defenses do not necessarily hold and demonstrate that tying is profitable under a wide range of circumstances. I also examine data from the Canadian newspaper- advertising industry and argue that price discrimination, cost saving, and quality control are unlikely motives for tying in this market. Nevertheless, with newspapers, tying and monopoly power go hand in hand.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://web.arts.ubc.ca/econ/DP9709.pdf
Our checks indicate that this address may not be valid because: 404 Not Found. If this is indeed the case, please notify (Maureen Chin)
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by UBC Department of Economics in its series Old UBC Departmental Papers with number 9709.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: Jan 1997
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ubc:bcecwp:9709

Contact details of provider:

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Maureen Chin).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies
L6 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Manufacturing
D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Thibaud Vergé, 2003. "Portfolio Effects and Merger Control: Full-line Forcing as an Entry Deterrence Strategy," Industrial Organization 0301010, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  2. Stephen Martin, 1998. "Strategic and Welfare Implications of Bundling," CIE Discussion Papers 1998-14, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Thibaud Verge, 2002. "Portfolio Analysis in European Merger Control: An Economic Analysis," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 02/046, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK. [Downloadable!]
  4. Thibaud Vergé, 2001. "Multiproduct Monopolist and Full-line Forcing: The Efficiency Argument Revisited," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 12, pages 1-9. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? RePEc stands for Research Papers in Economics.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-21.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.