Sen's social-evaluation-functional framework is used to reformulate Harsanyi's social aggregation problem so that both single-profile and multi-profile issues can be considered with allowance made for different assumptions concerning the measurability and comparability of individual utilities. Uncertainty is modelled using state-contingent alternatives with fixed state probabilities. Individual utility functions and social preferences are required to satisfy the expected utility hypothesis. On various domains, we investigate the extent to which the expected utility hypothesis can provide support for weighted utilitarianism when the social aggregation procedure is Paretian.
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Find related papers by JEL classification: D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
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BLACKORBY, Charles & BOSSERT, Walter & DONALDSON, David, 2002.
"In Defense of Welfarism,"
Cahiers de recherche
2002-02, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Blackorby, C. & Bossert, W. & Donaldson, D., 2002.
"In Defense of Welfarism,"
Cahiers de recherche
02-2002, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
[Downloadable!]