Retaliation and the role for punishment in the evolution of cooperation
AbstractModels of evolutionary game theory have shown that punishment may be an adaptive behaviour in environments characterised by a social-dilemma situation. Experimental evidence closely corresponds to this finding but questions the cooperation-enhancing effect of punishment if players are allowed to retaliate against their punishers. This study provides a theoretical explanation for the existence of retaliating behaviour in the context of repeated social dilemmas and analyses the role punishment can play in the evolution of cooperation under these conditions. We show a punishing strategy can pave the way for a partially-cooperative equilibrium of conditional cooperators and de- fecting types and, under positive mutation rates, foster the cooperation level in this equilibrium by prompting reluctant cooperators to cooperate. How- ever, when rare mutations occur, it cannot sustain cooperation by itself as punishment costs favour the spread of non-punishing cooperators.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz in its series TWI Research Paper Series with number 75.
Date of creation: 2012
Date of revision:
Public goods; Prisoner's Dilemma; Strong reciprocity; Counter-punishment;
Other versions of this item:
- Irenaeus Wolff, 2012. "Retaliation and the Role for Punishment in the Evolution of Cooperation," TWI Research Paper Series 77, Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz.
- Irenaeus Wolff, 2012. "Retaliation and the Role for Punishment in the Evolution of Cooperation," Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz 2012-13, Department of Economics, University of Konstanz.
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-03-28 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2012-03-28 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EVO-2012-03-28 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2012-03-28 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2012-03-28 (Game Theory)
- NEP-SOC-2012-03-28 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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