Agenda Setting and Reciprocal Vote Trading
AbstractWe study the implications of reciprocity on agenda setting in a sequential policy decision. We designed a laboratory experiment in which a committee decides sequentially on three independent bills. Selfish committee members would turn down all bills but reciprocity allows for implicit vote trading. This mechanism gives power to agenda setters. We find that agenda setters use their power when setting the agenda but are rather generous in the voting decision. Legislators benefiting from the chosen agenda support the agenda setter more frequently whereas those suffering from the chosen agenda punish the agenda setter. Nevertheless agenda setting increases efficiency.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz in its series TWI Research Paper Series with number 58.
Date of creation: 2010
Date of revision:
Agenda Setting; Sequential Voting; Vote Trading; Reciprocity; Experiment;
You can help add them by filling out this form.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ulrich Wacker).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.