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Three Sequential Cases: from Symmetry to Asymmetry

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  • Erwin Amann
  • Heng Qiao
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    Abstract

    Three critical cases, involving asymmetric and symmetric cases, in the sequential stages of the n-player repeated auctions are analyzed and compared. These cases might arise in a process of sequential, identical or equivalent auctions, where the auction result may reveal information about the strength or competitiveness of the participants. The behaviours of different players are characterized. Generally a player bids more aggressively when facing a strong player rather than a weak player. However a player favours competing with a weak one rather than a strong one. By applying the concept of Conditional Stochastic Dominance, revenues of players and the seller between the three stages are compared. It is proved that in this sequential process the information structure of the auctions changes and the seller’s revenue increases. Finally, this n-player asymmetric auction model can also be used to compare the revenues between high-bid and open auctions and especially the results first derived by Maskin and Riley (2000) in two-player case are proved to be valid in the n-player case.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz in its series TWI Research Paper Series with number 37.

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    Date of creation: 2008
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    Handle: RePEc:twi:respas:0037

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    Keywords: Asymmetric auction; Revenue comparison;

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    1. McAfee, R. Preston & McMillan, John, 1989. "Government procurement and international trade," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(3-4), pages 291-308, May.
    2. Maskin, Eric & Riley, John, 2000. "Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(3), pages 439-54, July.
    3. Gradstein, Mark & Konrad, Kai A, 1999. "Orchestrating Rent Seeking Contests," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(458), pages 536-45, October.
    4. Riley, John G, 1989. "Expected Revenue from Open and Sealed Bid Auctions," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 41-50, Summer.
    5. Maskin, Eric & Riley, John, 2000. "Asymmetric Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(3), pages 413-38, July.
    6. Richard L. Fullerton & R. Preston McAfee, 1999. "Auctioning Entry into Tournaments," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(3), pages 573-605, June.
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