EU Agri-environmental Programs and the "Restaurant Table Effect"
AbstractThe share of agricultural area enrolled in EU agri-environmental programs varies significantly between EU member states. These national differences are explained, based on a model that reflects both, that these programs internalize externalities and the political decision making process. We identify six factors which affect the extent to which agri-environmental programs are implemented: environmental benefits, opportunity costs of participation, budgetary pressure, the share of program expenditures financed by the EU, the political weight attributed to farmers at the national, and the political influence of each country at the EU level. In addition, we demonstrate that if the policy decision making process is non-cooperatively at the EU level, countries which contribute less to the EU budget will ceteris paribus implement more programs. Using data for four years and feasible Generalised Least Square methods we are able to confirm our theoretical results and a non-cooperative behavior of EU member states.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Technische Universität München, Environmental Economics and Agricultural Policy Group in its series Discussion Papers with number 042006.
Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2006
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Agricultural Economics (revised version; forthcoming)
agricultural policy; agri-environmental programs; European Union;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
- Q18 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Agricultural Policy; Food Policy
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-AGR-2007-02-17 (Agricultural Economics)
- NEP-ALL-2007-02-17 (All new papers)
- NEP-EEC-2007-02-17 (European Economics)
- NEP-ENV-2007-02-17 (Environmental Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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