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Solving a three player differential game in resource economics - the case of exhaustible resources

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  • Petra Huck

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    (Environmental Economics and Agricultural Policy Group, Technical University of Munich)

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    Abstract

    Differential games link strategic interactions between agents and optimization concerning time. Past and current actions of each player influence all future strategy sets and pay offs through a transition law. Due to high complexity, it is hard to find a Nash-equilibrium within a differential game and it is even harder to get some results in comparative statics. It is the purpose of the paper to describe an approximation routine for an open-loop Nash equilibrium of a simple differential game in exhaustible resources. Excel is applied as it is a wild spread tool.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Technische Universität München, Environmental Economics and Agricultural Policy Group in its series Discussion Papers with number 042005.

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    Length: 17 pages
    Date of creation: Apr 2005
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:tuu:papers:042005

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