Solving a three player differential game in resource economics - the case of exhaustible resources
AbstractDifferential games link strategic interactions between agents and optimization concerning time. Past and current actions of each player influence all future strategy sets and pay offs through a transition law. Due to high complexity, it is hard to find a Nash-equilibrium within a differential game and it is even harder to get some results in comparative statics. It is the purpose of the paper to describe an approximation routine for an open-loop Nash equilibrium of a simple differential game in exhaustible resources. Excel is applied as it is a wild spread tool.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Technische Universität München, Environmental Economics and Agricultural Policy Group in its series Discussion Papers with number 042005.
Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2005
Date of revision:
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- A22 - General Economics and Teaching - - Economic Education and Teaching of Economics - - - Undergraduate
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- Q30 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-02-17 (All new papers)
- NEP-CMP-2007-02-17 (Computational Economics)
- NEP-ENV-2007-02-17 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2007-02-17 (Game Theory)
You can help add them by filling out this form.
reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Roswitha Weinbrunn).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.