The College Choice Problem with Priorities
AbstractIn traditional school choice theory, the assignment mechanisms of students to schools suppose preferences for students and priorities for schools. In this paper, interested in the admission of students to colleges, we assume that all agents have priorities over the members of the opposite side. By considering that students have priorities over colleges, we reduce the incoherence and unfairness of assignments in order to respect the best possible students' educational needs.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS in its series Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) with number 201301.
Date of creation: Dec 2012
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Postal: CREM (UMR CNRS 6211) - Faculty of Economics, 7 place Hoche, 35065 Rennes Cedex - France
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics; Underlying Principles
- D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Market Design
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- I20 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-01-26 (All new papers)
- NEP-EDU-2013-01-26 (Education)
- NEP-GTH-2013-01-26 (Game Theory)
- NEP-LAB-2013-01-26 (Labour Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Tayfun Sönmez, 2003.
"School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 729-747, June.
- SÃ¶nmez, Tayfun & Pathak, Parag A. & Abdulkadiroglu, Atila & Roth, Alvin, 2005.
"The Boston Public School Match,"
2562764, Harvard University Department of Economics.
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