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College Choice Mechanism: The Respect of the Vagueness of Choices

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  • Litsa Alexandra

    (University of Caen Basse-Normandie, Center of Research in Economics and Management, Caen, France)

  • Maguet Jean-François

    (University of Caen Basse-Normandie, Center of Research in Economics and Management, Caen, France)

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    Abstract

    Taking as a starting point the theory of matching applied in the case of a problem of college admissions, where one is interested only to strict preference profiles for students and colleges, a part of the literature has been oriented towards profiles of priorities for colleges. In this paper we will assume that students have also their own priorities to which is associated some 'fuzzy'. This vagueness designates the preference of an individual (resp. college) for a college relative to parameters that characterize the latter one (resp. individual). Thus, we talk about fuzzy priorities. Our purpose is to analyze this aspect and to propose a real-life mechanism which will take into consideration the fuzzy priority profiles of both students and colleges, in order to achieve the best possible matching that is stable, strategy-proof, Pareto efficient and fair.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS in its series Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) with number 201202.

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    Date of creation: Jan 2012
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    Handle: RePEc:tut:cremwp:201202

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    Related research

    Keywords: Education; Priorities; Preferences; Fuzzy; Algorithm; Matching;

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    References

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    1. Ozkal-Sanver, Ipek, 2004. "A note on gender fairness in matching problems," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 211-217, March.
    2. Antonio Romero-Medina, 2001. "`Sex-Equal' Stable Matchings," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 50(3), pages 197-212, May.
    3. EHLERS, Lars, 2010. "School Choice with Control," Cahiers de recherche 2010-05, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
    4. Ma, Jinpeng, 1994. "Strategy-Proofness and the Strict Core in a Market with Indivisibilities," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 23(1), pages 75-83.
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