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On the evaluation of power in Parliaments and government formation

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Author Info
Nicolas G Andjiga (ENS – University of Yaoundé)
Daoud Badirou (CREM – CNRS)
Boniface Mbih (CREM – CNRS)
Abstract

This paper is devoted to the study of power in Parliaments. We explain how the power of coalitions can be computed after political elections, and as a di¤erence with some previous papers, this analysis is used to give a prediction of what government can emerge from these elections.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS in its series Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) with number 200618.

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Date of creation: 2006
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Handle: RePEc:tut:cremwp:200618

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Related research
Keywords: power indices; parliamentary method; core;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

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