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The opposite Cycles of Laws and Decrees

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Author Info

  • Francesco Lagona

    (DIPES, University Roma Tre, Italy)

  • Antonello Maruotti

    (DIPES, University Roma Tre, Italy)

  • Fabio Padovano

    (CREM-CNRS and Condorcet Center for Political Economy, Université Rennes, 1, France and DIPES, University Roma Tre, Italy)

Abstract

The present study aims to test Meltzer and Richard’s (1981) hypothesis that lower-income individuals vote for candidates who favor higher taxes and more redistribution. Assuming that left-wing parties advocate a general increase in taxation, we estimate a vote function for the French Cantonal elections. We show clear-cut evidence that an increasing proportion of voters receiving social assistance raises the number of votes in favor of left-wing parties. This result highlights the importance of including redistribution aspects when estimating a vote function.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Condorcet Center for political Economy in its series Economics Working Paper from Condorcet Center for political Economy at CREM-CNRS with number 2012-01-ccr.

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Date of creation: Mar 2012
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Handle: RePEc:tut:cccrwp:2012-01-ccr

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Related research

Keywords: Economic theory of legislation - Multilevel models - Poisson regression - Political legislation cycle - Random effects - Voters - Special interest groups;

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  1. Padovano, Fabio & Venturi, Larissa, 2001. " Wars of Attrition in Italian Government Coalitions and Fiscal Performance: 1948-1994," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 109(1-2), pages 15-54, October.
  2. Vincenzo Galasso & Tommaso Nannicini, 2010. "Competing on Good Politicians," Working Papers 368, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
  3. Francesco Lagona & Fabio Padovano, 2008. "The political legislation cycle," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 134(3), pages 201-229, March.
  4. Wittman, Donald A., 1997. "The Myth of Democratic Failure," University of Chicago Press Economics Books, University of Chicago Press, edition 1, number 9780226904238, March.
  5. Rabe-Hesketh, Sophia & Skrondal, Anders & Pickles, Andrew, 2005. "Maximum likelihood estimation of limited and discrete dependent variable models with nested random effects," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 128(2), pages 301-323, October.
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Cited by:
  1. Fabio Padovano & Ilaria Petrarca, 2013. "When and how politicians take ‘scandalous’ decisions?," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 24(4), pages 336-351, December.

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