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How Liable should an Exporter be? The Case of Trade in Hazardous Goods

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Author Info
Carsten Helm () (Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre (Department of Economics), Technische Universität Darmstadt (Darmstadt University of Technology))

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Abstract

This paper analyzes liability issues in the context of internationally traded goods like hazardous waste. If waste disposers of a small open economy are judgement-proof, then the extension of liability to waste exporters distorts the factor allocation and may reduce disposal care. Hence the optimal extension is partial at most. However, extending liability increases incentives of the waste importing country to hold domestic disposers liable. Interaction through the price system and through contracts that condition payments for disposal services on the occurrence of an accident yield identical outcomes if disposers are judgement-proof.

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File URL: http://www.bwl.tu-darmstadt.de/vwl/forsch/veroeff/papers/ddpie_153.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre (Department of Economics), Technische Universität Darmstadt (Darmstadt University of Technology) in its series Darmstadt Discussion Papers in Economics with number 153.

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Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2005
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Handle: RePEc:tud:ddpiec:153

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Related research
Keywords: extended liability; hazardous waste trade; externalities; moral hazard;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
K1 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law
Q38 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy (includes OPEC Policy)
F18 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade and Environment
D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Boyd, James & Ingberman, Daniel E, 1997. "The Search for Deep Pockets: Is "Extended Liability" Expensive Liability?," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 13(1), pages 232-58, April.
  2. Marcel Boyer & Jean-Jacques Laffont, 1995. "Environmental Protection, Producer Insolvency and Lender Liability," CIRANO Working Papers 95s-50, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Boyer, Marcel & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1997. "Environmental risks and bank liability," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(8), pages 1427-1459, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Pitchford, Rohan, 1998. "Moral hazard and limited liability: The real effects of contract bargaining," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 251-259, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Michael Rauscher, 2001. "International Trade, Foreign Investment, and the Enivronment," Thuenen-Series of Applied Economic Theory 29, University of Rostock, Institute of Economics, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Copeland, Brian R., 1991. "International trade in waste products in the presence of illegal disposal," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 143-162, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Dieter Balkenborg, 2001. "How Liable Should a Lender Be? The Case of Judgment-Proof Firms and Environmental Risk: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 731-738, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1995. "Regulation, moral hazard and insurance of environmental risks," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(3), pages 319-336, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Tracy R. Lewis & David E. M. Sappington, 2001. "How Liable Should a Lender Be? The Case of Judgment-Proof Firms and Environmental Risk: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 724-730, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Feess, E. & Hege, U., 2000. "Safety monitoring, capital structure, and "financial responsibility"," Discussion Paper 33, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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  11. T. Randolph Beard, 1990. "Bankruptcy and Care Choice," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(4), pages 626-634, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Posey, Lisa Lipowski, 1993. "Limited liability and incentives when firms can inflict damages greater than net worth," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 325-330, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Dominique Demougin & Carsten Helm, 2006. "Moral Hazard and Bargaining Power," German Economic Review, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 7, pages 463-470, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Eberhard Feess, 1999. "Lender Liability for Environmental Harm: An Argument Against Negligence Based Rules," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 231-250, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Paul R. Milgrom, 1981. "Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 12(2), pages 380-391, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  16. Hiriart, Yolande & Martimort, David, 2004. "Environmental Risk Regulation and Liability under Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard," IDEI Working Papers 256, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
  17. Dionne, Georges & Spaeter, Sandrine, 2003. "Environmental risk and extended liability: The case of green technologies," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(5-6), pages 1025-1060, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
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