IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ttu/wpaper/162.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Cooperative Norms and Defection in Prisonerís Dilemma Game: Analytic Narratives on Evolution of Strategic Non-cooperative Behaviour in the Network

Author

Listed:
  • Kaire Pıder

    (Estonian Business School)

Abstract

The evolutionary game theory and network segregation models are used for explaining strategic changes in micro behaviour. Simulations are used for modelling strategic responses based on interviews. Prisonersí dilemma situation is used in infinitely iterated games, where randomness is created through exogenous shock of opening the network to ìaliensî. Also the number of connections is modified and different discount factors are used. Consequently it is found that large and small networks differ by behavioural strategies: in large networks individuals are more self-regarding and reciprocal only to benevolent behaviour; in small networks people rely on cooperative social norms.

Suggested Citation

  • Kaire Pıder, 2007. "Cooperative Norms and Defection in Prisonerís Dilemma Game: Analytic Narratives on Evolution of Strategic Non-cooperative Behaviour in the Network," Working Papers 162, Tallinn School of Economics and Business Administration, Tallinn University of Technology.
    • Handle: RePEc:ttu:wpaper:162
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://deepthought.ttu.ee/majandus/tekstid/TUTWPE_07_162.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    More about this item

    Keywords

    evolutionary game theory; strategic behaviour; networks;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • B52 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary; Modern Monetary Theory;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ttu:wpaper:162. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Urve Venesaar (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/fettuee.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.