Equilibria in Asymmetric Auctions with Entry
AbstractRegarding optimal design in the private value environment, there is an unsolved discrepancy in the literature regarding asymmetric auctions and auctions with endogenous participation; Literature on the former suggests that well-designed distortive mechanisms are optimal (revenue maximizing) assuming the bidding costs are negligible, while that on the latter insists that the mechanisms with free entry and no distortion are optimal provided that the potential bidders are ex ante symmetric.This paper is the first attempt to reconcile the two views by establishing a model for asymmetric auctions with costly participation. The main findings are threefold; First, an optimal outcome is possible if and only if the mechanism is ex post efficient. Second, without any participation control, a coordination problem is likely in which only the weak bidders participate and the strong bidders stay out. Finally, there is an entry fee/subsidization scheme which, together with an ex post efficient mechanism, induces the optimal outcome as a unique equilibrium.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Economics, Graduate School of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Tsukuba in its series Tsukuba Economics Working Papers with number 2010-002.
Date of creation: Jan 2010
Date of revision:
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-02-05 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2010-02-05 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-CTA-2010-02-05 (Contract Theory & Applications)
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- Jun Nakabayashi, 2009.
"Small Business Set-asides in Procurement Auctions: An Empirical Analysis,"
Tsukuba Economics Working Papers
2009-005, Economics, Graduate School of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Tsukuba, revised Nov 2009.
- Nakabayashi, Jun, 2013. "Small business set-asides in procurement auctions: An empirical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 28-44.
- Jun Nakabayashi, 2010. "Small Business Set-asides in Procurement Auctions: An Empirical Analysis," Global COE Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series gd09-126, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
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