On the strategic value of risk management
AbstractThis article examines how rms facing volatile input prices and holding some degree of market power in their product market link their risk management and their production or pricing strategies. This issue is relevant in many industries ranging from manufacturing to energy retailing, where risk averse rms decide on their hedging strategies before their product market strategies. We nd that hedging modi es the pricing and production strategies of rms. This strategic e¤ect is channelled through the risk-adjusted expected cost, i.e., the expected marginal cost under the probability measure induced by shareholders risk aversion. It has opposite e¤ects depending on the nature of product market competition: hedging toughens quantity competition while it softens price competition. Finally, if rms can decide not to commit on their hedging position, this can never be an equilibriumoutcome: committing is always a best response to non committing. In the Hotelling model, committing is a dominant strategy for all rms.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) in its series TSE Working Papers with number 13-433.
Date of creation: 14 Sep 2013
Date of revision:
Risk Management; Price and Quantity Competition.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-10-25 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2013-10-25 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-RMG-2013-10-25 (Risk Management)
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