IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/tse/wpaper/27644.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

On the strategic value of risk management

Author

Listed:
  • Léautier, Thomas-Olivier
  • Rochet, Jean-Charles

Abstract

This article examines how firms facing volatile input prices and holding some degree of market power in their product market link their risk management and their production or pricing strategies. This issue is relevant in many industries ranging from manufacturing to energy retailing, where risk averse firms decide on their hedging strategies before their product market strategies. We find that hedging modifies the pricing and production strategies of firms. This strategic effect is channelled through the risk-adjusted expected cost, i.e., the expected marginal cost under the probability measure induced by shareholders' risk aversion. It has opposite effects depending on the nature of product market competition: hedging toughens quantity competition while it softens price competition. Finally, if firms can decide not to commit on their hedging position, this can never be an equilibriumoutcome: committing is always a best response to non committing. In the Hotelling model, committing is a dominant strategy for all firms.

Suggested Citation

  • Léautier, Thomas-Olivier & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 2013. "On the strategic value of risk management," TSE Working Papers 13-433, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  • Handle: RePEc:tse:wpaper:27644
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.tse-fr.eu/sites/default/files/medias/doc/wp/io/wp_tse_433.pdf
    File Function: Full text
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Patrick Bolton & Hui Chen & Neng Wang, 2011. "A Unified Theory of Tobin's q, Corporate Investment, Financing, and Risk Management," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 66(5), pages 1545-1578, October.
    2. Volker Nocke & John Thanassoulis, 2014. "Vertical Relations Under Credit Constraints," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 12(2), pages 337-367, April.
    3. Bruno Biais & Thomas Mariotti & Guillaume Plantin & Jean-Charles Rochet, 2007. "Dynamic Security Design: Convergence to Continuous Time and Asset Pricing Implications," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 74(2), pages 345-390.
    4. Yanbo Jin & Philippe Jorion, 2006. "Firm Value and Hedging: Evidence from U.S. Oil and Gas Producers," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 61(2), pages 893-919, April.
    5. Brander, James A. & Lewis, Tracy R., 1986. "Oligopoly and Financial Structure: The Limited Liability Effect," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(5), pages 956-970, December.
    6. Gordon M. Bodnar & Bernard Dumas & Richard C. Marston, 2002. "Pass‐through and Exposure," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 57(1), pages 199-231, February.
    7. David A. Carter & Daniel A. Rogers & Betty J. Simkins, 2006. "Does Hedging Affect Firm Value? Evidence from the US Airline Industry," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 35(1), pages 53-86, March.
    8. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1984. "The Fat-Cat Effect, the Puppy-Dog Ploy, and the Lean and Hungry Look," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(2), pages 361-366, May.
    9. Blaise Allaz, 1992. "Oligopoly, uncertainty and strategic forward transactions," Post-Print hal-00511812, HAL.
    10. Hendrik Bessembinder & Michael L. Lemmon, 2002. "Equilibrium Pricing and Optimal Hedging in Electricity Forward Markets," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 57(3), pages 1347-1382, June.
    11. Jean Tirole, 2006. "The Theory of Corporate Finance," Post-Print hal-00173191, HAL.
    12. Jean‐Paul Décamps & Thomas Mariotti & Jean‐Charles Rochet & Stéphane Villeneuve, 2011. "Free Cash Flow, Issuance Costs, and Stock Prices," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 66(5), pages 1501-1544, October.
    13. Hughes, John S. & Kao, Jennifer L., 1997. "Strategic forward contracting and observability," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 121-133, November.
    14. PETER M. DeMARZO & YULIY SANNIKOV, 2006. "Optimal Security Design and Dynamic Capital Structure in a Continuous‐Time Agency Model," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 61(6), pages 2681-2724, December.
    15. Frederic Loss, 2012. "Optimal Hedging Strategies and Interactions between Firms," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(1), pages 79-129, March.
    16. Rochet, Jean Charles & Villeneuve, Stéphane, 2004. "Liquidity Risk and Corporate Demand for Hedging and Insurance," CEPR Discussion Papers 4755, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    17. repec:dau:papers:123456789/12110 is not listed on IDEAS
    18. Allaz, Blaise, 1992. "Oligopoly, uncertainty and strategic forward transactions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 297-308, June.
    19. Tim Adam & Sudipto Dasgupta & Sheridan Titman, 2007. "Financial Constraints, Competition, and Hedging in Industry Equilibrium," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 62(5), pages 2445-2473, October.
    20. Dionne, Georges & Santugini, Marc, 2014. "Entry, imperfect competition, and futures market for the input," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 70-83.
    21. Décamps, Jean-Paul & Mariotti, Thomas & Rochet, Jean-Charles & Villeneuve, Stéphane, 2008. "Free Cash-Flow, Issuance Costs and Stock Price Volatility," IDEI Working Papers 518, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
    22. Froot, Kenneth A & Scharfstein, David S & Stein, Jeremy C, 1993. "Risk Management: Coordinating Corporate Investment and Financing Policies," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 48(5), pages 1629-1658, December.
    23. Kristopher S. Gerardi & Adam Hale Shapiro, 2009. "Does Competition Reduce Price Dispersion? New Evidence from the Airline Industry," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 117(1), pages 1-37, February.
    24. Xavier Vives, 2001. "Oligopoly Pricing: Old Ideas and New Tools," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 026272040x, December.
    25. Ian Sheldon & Richard Sperling, 2003. "Estimating the Extent of Imperfect Competition in the Food Industry: What Have We Learned?," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(1), pages 89-109, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Hamed Ghoddusi & Franz Wirl, 2019. "A Risk-Hedging View to Refinery Capacity Investment," Working Papers 1327, Economic Research Forum, revised 21 Aug 2019.
    2. Georges Dionne & Marc Santugini, 2015. "Production Flexibility and Hedging," Risks, MDPI, vol. 3(4), pages 1-10, December.
    3. Dionne, Georges & Santugini, Marc, 2014. "Entry, imperfect competition, and futures market for the input," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 70-83.
    4. Caleb Cox & Arzé Karam & Matthias Pelster, 2022. "Two-Period Duopolies with Forward Markets," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 60(1), pages 29-62, February.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Broll, Udo & Wahl, Jack E. & Wessel, Christoph, 2008. "Export production, hedging exchange rate risk: the duopoly case," Dresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics 06/08, Technische Universität Dresden, Faculty of Business and Economics, Department of Economics.
    2. Hoang, Daniel & Ruckes, Martin, 2017. "Corporate risk management, product market competition, and disclosure," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 107-121.
    3. Hoang, Daniel & Ruckes, Martin, 2014. "The effects of disclosure policy on risk management incentives and market entry," Working Paper Series in Economics 65, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Department of Economics and Management.
    4. Matthias Pelster, 2015. "Marketable and non-hedgeable risk in a duopoly framework with hedging," Journal of Economics and Finance, Springer;Academy of Economics and Finance, vol. 39(4), pages 697-716, October.
    5. Patrick Bolton & Neng Wang & Jinqiang Yang, 2019. "Optimal Contracting, Corporate Finance, and Valuation with Inalienable Human Capital," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 74(3), pages 1363-1429, June.
    6. Remco van Eijkel & Jose Luis Moraga, 2010. "Do Firms sell forward for Strategic Reasons? An Application to the Wholesale Market for Natural Gas," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 10-058/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    7. Miguel Vazquez, 2012. "Analysis of the strategic use of forward contracting in electricity markets," RSCAS Working Papers 2012/13, European University Institute.
    8. Argenton, Cédric & Willems, Bert, 2015. "Exclusion through speculation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 1-9.
    9. Jukka Isohätälä & Alistair Milne & Donald Robertson, 2020. "The Net Worth Trap: Investment and Output Dynamics in the Presence of Financing Constraints," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 8(8), pages 1-32, August.
    10. Sanghak Choi & Hyeonung Jang & Daejin Kim & Byoung Ki Seo, 2021. "Derivatives use and the value of cash holdings: Evidence from the U.S. oil and gas industry," Journal of Futures Markets, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 41(3), pages 361-383, March.
    11. Heitor Almeida & Murillo Campello & Igor Cunha & Michael S. Weisbach, 2014. "Corporate Liquidity Management: A Conceptual Framework and Survey," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 6(1), pages 135-162, December.
    12. Décamps, Jean-Paul & Gryglewicz, S. & Morellec, E. & Villeneuve, Stéphane, 2015. "Corporate Policies with Temporary and Permanent Shocks," TSE Working Papers 15-552, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised 15 Jun 2016.
    13. Rampini, Adriano A. & Viswanathan, S., 2013. "Collateral and capital structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(2), pages 466-492.
    14. Federico Etro, 2006. "Market Leaders and Industrial Policy," Working Papers 103, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Nov 2006.
    15. Markus Hang & Jerome Geyer‐Klingeberg & Andreas W. Rathgeber & Stefan Stöckl, 2021. "Rather complements than substitutes: Firm value effects of capital structure and financial hedging decisions," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 26(4), pages 4895-4917, October.
    16. Giroud, Xavier & Dai, Min & Jiang, Wei & Wang, Neng, 2020. "A q Theory of Internal Capital Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers 15341, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    17. Fauver, Larry & Naranjo, Andy, 2010. "Derivative usage and firm value: The influence of agency costs and monitoring problems," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 16(5), pages 719-735, December.
    18. Patrick Bolton & Ye Li & Neng Wang & Jinqiang Yang, 2020. "Dynamic Banking and the Value of Deposits," NBER Working Papers 28298, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    19. Furió, Dolores & Meneu, Vicente, 2010. "Expectations and forward risk premium in the Spanish deregulated power market," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 784-793, February.
    20. Bolton, Patrick & Wang, Neng & Yang, Jinqiang, 2019. "Investment under uncertainty with financial constraints," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 184(C).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Risk Management; Price and Quantity Competition;

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:tse:wpaper:27644. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/tsetofr.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.