Majority Voting and the Single Crossing Property when Voters Belong to Separate Groupes The Role of the Continuity and Strict Monotonicity Assumptions
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) in its series TSE Working Papers with number 265.
Date of creation: May 2010
Date of revision: Jan 2012
Other versions of this item:
- De Donder, Philippe, 2010. "Majority Voting and the Single Crossing Property when Voters Belong to Separate Groupes The Role of the Continuity and Strict Monotonicity Assumptions," IDEI Working Papers 693, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised Jan 2012.
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Gans, Joshua S. & Smart, Michael, 1996. "Majority voting with single-crossing preferences," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 219-237, February.
- Russo, Antonio, 2012. "Voting on Road Congestion Policy," TSE Working Papers 12-310, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Nov 2012.
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