Should Economists Listen to Educational Psychologists? Some Economics of Student Motivation
AbstractThis paper sheds light on the role of student motivation in the success of schooling. We develop a model in which a teacher engages in the management of student moti- vation through the choice of the classroom environment. We show that the teacher is able to motivate high-ability students, at least in the short run, by designing a com- petitive environment. For students with low ability, risk aversion, or when engaged in a long-term relationship, the teacher designs a classroom environment that is more focused on mastery and self-referenced standards. In doing so, the teacher helps to develop the intrinsic motivation of students and their capacity to overcome failures.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) in its series TSE Working Papers with number 11-247.
Date of creation: 22 May 2011
Date of revision:
Education; Student achievement; Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation;
Other versions of this item:
- Jocelyn Donze & Trude Gunnes, 2011. "Should Economists Listen to Educational Psychologists? Some Economics of Student Motivation," Working Paper Series 12211, Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology.
- Jocelyn Donze & Trude Gunnes, 2011. "Should economists listen to educational psychologists? Some economics of student motivation," Discussion Papers 662, Research Department of Statistics Norway.
- Donze, Jocelyn & Gunnes, Trude, 2011. "Should Economists Listen to Educational Psychologists? : Some Economics of Student Motivation," MPRA Paper 31059, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics; Underlying Principles
- I21 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Analysis of Education
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-11-28 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2011-11-28 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EDU-2011-11-28 (Education)
- NEP-HRM-2011-11-28 (Human Capital & Human Resource Management)
- NEP-LAB-2011-11-28 (Labour Economics)
- NEP-URE-2011-11-28 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
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