Regulatory Schemes and Political Capture in a Local Public Sector
AbstractWe consider a framework of contractual interactions between urban transport authorities and transport operators. We estimate simultaneously the choice of contract by the authorities and the effect of regulation on the cost reducing activity of the operators. We test whether regulatory schemes currently implemented in the industry are the observable items of a more general menu of second best contracts. We suggest that the generation process of the data we have in hand is better explained by the political aspects of regulation. Moreover, the cost reducing effort of the operators is greater under fixed-price regimes, compared to the cost-plus case.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) in its series TSE Working Papers with number 10-158.
Date of creation: May 2010
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Gagnepain, Philippe & Ivaldi, Marc, 2010. "Regulatory Schemes and Political Capture in a Local Public Sector," IDEI Working Papers 609, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- NEP-ALL-2010-10-02 (All new papers)
- NEP-PBE-2010-10-02 (Public Economics)
- NEP-POL-2010-10-02 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-REG-2010-10-02 (Regulation)
- NEP-URE-2010-10-02 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
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