Karan Bhanot (University of Texas at San Antonio) Donald Lien (University of Texas at San Antonio) Margot Quijano (University of Texas at San Antonio)
Abstract
Recent comments by the Federal Reserve Chairman have renewed concerns about whether the government would protect bondholders in the event of default by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (F&F). Using a model of capital structure, we analyze the impact of this uncertainty on the value of the implicit subsidy. We show that, counter to intuition, an increase in the likelihood that the government will not subsidize these entities via a guarantee may increase the expected cost of the subsidy to the Federal Government. A cap on the value of the investment portfolio of F&F is a more effective mechanism to reduce the risk exposure of the federal government. We also assess the design and impact of proposed receivership rules and highlight the problems in regulating GSE portfolios.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by College of Business, University of Texas at San Antonio in its series Working Papers with number
0035.
Find related papers by JEL classification: G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: