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Determinants Of Outside Director Turnover

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Author Info

  • Sharad Asthana

    (The University of Texas at San Antonio)

  • Steven Balsam

    (Fox School of Business and Management)

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    Abstract

    In this paper we provide evidence that independent director turnover is influenced by a series of economic factors. Directors, both independent and insider, are less likely to leave if they are paid well or if the firm has a director pension plan. They are also more likely to leave when the firm is performing poorly or when they expect it to perform poorly. They are more likely to leave when the firm is riskier, but are less likely to leave when they chair certain committees such as the audit and compensation committee, which may bring them more prestige, or perhaps an additional stipend. Differentially, the association between turnover and firm performance is weaker for inside directors. This is consistent with inside directors’ response to reputation concerns being lower than that of independent directors due to the bonding and compensation effects.

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    File URL: http://business.utsa.edu/wps/acc/0023ACC-501-2007.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by College of Business, University of Texas at San Antonio in its series Working Papers with number 0023.

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    Length: 38 pages
    Date of creation:
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:tsa:wpaper:0023

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    Related research

    Keywords: Director turnover; economic factors;

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    1. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, 1979. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk," Levine's Working Paper Archive 7656, David K. Levine.
    2. Robert E. Quinn & John Rohrbaugh, 1983. "A Spatial Model of Effectiveness Criteria: Towards a Competing Values Approach to Organizational Analysis," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 29(3), pages 363-377, March.
    3. Herriott, Scott R & Levinthal, Daniel & March, James G, 1985. "Learning from Experience in Organizations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(2), pages 298-302, May.
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