By bridging the gap between the strategic model of sanctions and the public choice framework of sanctions, we introduce a new sanctions game. Contrary to an earlier finding, we show that the partial compliance of the target country along with mild sanctions are not only equilibrium, but also Pareto superior to non-compliance and tough economic sanctions.
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Paper provided by College of Business, University of Texas at San Antonio in its series Working Papers with number
0016.
Find related papers by JEL classification: F1 - International Economics - - Trade L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior