In this work we test the power of precedent transfer in improving group coordination in the minimum-effort or weak-link game with large groups. In the game groups of players must each pick an integer between 1 and 7. The payoff to each player increases in the minimum number picked, but decreases in the difference between the number picked and the minimum number in the group. The game has multiple Nash equilibria, which are Pareto-ranked. The equilibrium in which everybody picks 7 is the best since it assure everybody the highest possible payoff; however, picking low numbers is safer in the presence of uncertainty about other players' choices, so the game expresses a tradeoff between efficiency and security that reflects several organizational situations characterized by tight interdependence between actors' decisions. We test whether groups which play a different coordination game in which chances to reach the best equilibrium are higher than in the minimum effort game can then transfer the homegrown precedent of efficiency to the minimum effort game, achieving better coordination results compared to baseline treatments. We also test whether the opposite holds, i.e., whether inefficient precedents achieved by groups in the minimum effort game negatively affect the subsequent probability of reaching the efficient equilibrium in other games.
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Paper provided by Department of Computer and Management Sciences, University of Trento, Italy in its series ROCK Working Papers with number
017.