In this paper we briefly describe a tacit and simultaneous n person coordination game designed to reflect economic decisions characterized by "installed base" and "increasing returns" phenomena. We then present some preliminary experimental studies on this game in which different information treatments are tested. Our preliminary results show that in the presence of full information about the players' entire distribution of choices, some groups are able to achieve efficiency in the absence of mutual communication. Efficient outcomes in some instances are achieved through a gradual and time-dependent dynamic of "collective hill-climbing" that creates convergence to the payoff-dominant equilibrium. The addition to the payoff function of increasing returns in the number of players choosing the same action seems to favor rather than obstacle successful coordination. Finally, we test the extent to which a successful precedent achieved by a group in the Critical mass game may be subsequently applied by the same group to achieve effciency in the minimum action game.
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Paper provided by Department of Computer and Management Sciences, University of Trento, Italy in its series ROCK Working Papers with number
005.