We model individual decision making in unfamiliar settings using constraint satisfaction networks. We investigate to what extent team communication might overcome the limits of partially informed and heterogeneous agents, allowing them to improve their choices in dyadic decision making settings (in terms of compatibility with the choices that they would undertake if fully informed). We show that communication has a non-monotonic effect: while, starting from low levels, increases in the communication strength result in better performance, when one exceeds the optimal degree, performance declines up to a point in which independent agents perform better than agents communicating in teams. We show that this is largely due to the fact that too much communication confuses agents, blocking the process of choosing one alternative over another one. We also show that similar G121 considerations apply if we substitute independent choice under communication with a voting procedure.
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Paper provided by Department of Computer and Management Sciences, University of Trento, Italy in its series Quaderni DISA with number
118.