A three-person multi-stage bargaining game is investigated in laboratory controlled conditions. Experimental results seem to be qualitatively consistent with field evidence collected in the European automotive industry (e.g. perceived fairness/unfairness of tier one behavior and reciprocal concerns seems to affect strongly the final outcome of the negotiation) and suggest how the disclosure of information asymmetries among the three subjects seems to improve the bargaining process, making all three subjects better off.
Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page
whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be
available.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by Department of Computer and Management Sciences, University of Trento, Italy in its series Quaderni DISA with number
058.