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A Social Contract Account for CSR as Extended Model of Corporate Governance (Part I): Rational Bargaining and Justification

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  • Lorenzo Sacconi

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Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia in its series Department of Economics Working Papers with number 0410.

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Date of creation: 2004
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Handle: RePEc:trn:utwpde:0410

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  1. Harsanyi,John C., 1986. "Rational Behaviour and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521311830, April.
  2. Grossman, Sanford J. & Hart, Oliver D., 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Scholarly Articles 3450060, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  3. Alchian, Armen A & Demsetz, Harold, 1972. "Production , Information Costs, and Economic Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 777-95, December.
  4. Tirole, Jean, 1999. "Corporate Governance," CEPR Discussion Papers 2086, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Michael C. Jensen, 2001. "Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, And The Corporate Objective Function," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 14(3), pages 8-21.
  6. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
  7. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, . "Power in a Theory of the Firm," CRSP working papers 335, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
  8. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1988. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Working papers 495, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  9. Donaldson, Thomas & Dunfee, Thomas W., 1995. "Integrative Social Contracts Theory," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 11(01), pages 85-112, April.
  10. Edward Freeman, R. & Evan, William M., 1990. "Corporate governance: A stakeholder interpretation," Journal of Behavioral Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(4), pages 337-359.
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