Personal Autonomy in Trust-Based Interactions. An Experimental Analysis
AbstractThe paper experimentally investigates the interactions between restrictions to personal autonomy and reciprocity in a Principal-Agent relationship. Previous experimental contributions have shown that actions aimed at restricting decisional autonomy are likely to reduce reciprocity in trust- based relationships. Results in our experiment, which is a modified version of the Investment Game, differ from previous findings and conform more to standard economic predictions. Principals in our interaction do not support the self-determination of agents. On the other side, agents do not show any positive reciprocity when allowed to freely determine their behavior in the game. (This is an updated version of the CEEL Working Paper 2-05)
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia in its series CEEL Working Papers with number 0701.
Date of creation: 2007
Date of revision:
Principal-Agent relationship; Trust; Reciprocity; Self-Determination; Incentives;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- M50 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Personnel Economics - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-02-17 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2007-02-17 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2007-02-17 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2007-02-17 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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