Nonprofit Firms in a Linear City with Nonnegative Profits
AbstractIn a linear city model of firm location, firms have altruistic objective functions that consist of a linear combination of maximizing profits and producing output, although firms are constrained to earn nonnegative profits. If firms place sufficient weight on maximizing profits, then firms locate at the ends of the linear city, just as in the firm location game under profit maximization. If firms place sufficient weight on producing output, then firms will locate at the median of the linear city, just as in the candidate voting game.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Trinity College, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 1403.
Length: 8 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2014
Date of revision:
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Nonprofit; Linear City;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L31 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Nonprofit Institutions; NGOs
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2014-04-11 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2014-04-11 (Business Economics)
- NEP-GER-2014-04-11 (German Papers)
- NEP-URE-2014-04-11 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Deneffe, Daniel & Masson, Robert T., 2002. "What do not-for-profit hospitals maximize?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 461-492, April.
- Dranove, David, 1988. "Pricing by non-profit institutions : The case of hospital cost-shifting," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 47-57, March.
- Harrison Teresa D. & Lybecker Kristina M., 2005. "The Effect of the Nonprofit Motive on Hospital Competitive Behavior," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 4(1), pages 1-17, May.
- Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Theory of Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200716, December.
- Lakdawalla, Darius & Philipson, Tomas, 2006. "The nonprofit sector and industry performance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(8-9), pages 1681-1698, September.
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