A dynamic auction for multi-object procurement under a hard budget constraint
AbstractWe present a new dynamic auction for procurement problems where payments are bounded by a hard budget constraint and money does not enter the procurer's objective function.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich in its series Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems with number 310.
Date of creation: Mar 2010
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More information through EDIRC
Auctions; Mechanism Design; Knapsack Problem; Dominant Strategy; Budget; Procurement;
Other versions of this item:
- Ensthaler, Ludwig & Giebe, Thomas, 2014. "A dynamic auction for multi-object procurement under a hard budget constraint," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 179-189.
- D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
- D45 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Rationing; Licensing
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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