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Creditor Rights and Debt Allocation within Multinationals

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  • Akbel, Basak
  • Schnitzer, Monika

Abstract

We analyze the optimal debt structure of multinational corporations choosing between centralized or decentralized borrowing. We identify how this choice is affected by creditor rights and bankruptcy costs, taking into account managerial incentives and coinsurance considerations. We find that partially centralized borrowing structures are optimal with either weak or strong creditor rights. For intermediate levels of creditor rights fully decentralized (centralized) borrowing structures are optimal if managers have strong (weak) empire building dencies. Decentralized borrowing is more attractive for companies focussing on short-term profitability. Credits are rather taken in countries with better creditor rights and more efficient insolvency systems.

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Paper provided by Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich in its series Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems with number 304.

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Date of creation: Nov 2009
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Handle: RePEc:trf:wpaper:304

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Keywords: Multinational corporations; capital structure; creditor rights; coinsurance; internal capital markets;

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Cited by:
  1. Löffler, Clemens & Pfeiffer, Thomas, 2013. "Centralized versus Decentralized External Financing, Winner Picking and Corporate Socialism," Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79902, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  2. Nejadmalayeri, Ali & Singh, Manohar, 2012. "Corporate taxes, strategic default, and the cost of debt," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(11), pages 2900-2916.

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