Can intentions spoil the kindness of a gift? - An experimental study
AbstractConsider a situation where person A undertakes acostly action that benefits person B. This behavior seems altruistic. However, if A expects a reward in return from B, then A's action may be motivated by expected rewards rather than by pure altruism. The question we address in this experimental study is how B reacts to A's intentions. We vary the probability that the second mover in a trust game can reciprocate and analyze effects on second mover behavior. Our results suggest that expected rewards do not spoil the perceived kindness of an action and the action's rewards.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich in its series Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems with number 302.
Date of creation: Oct 2009
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More information through EDIRC
social preferences; intentions; beliefs; psychological game theory; experiment;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics; Underlying Principles
- D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-01-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2010-01-23 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2010-01-23 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2010-01-23 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
- NEP-UPT-2010-01-23 (Utility Models & Prospect Theory)
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