Bank Competition - When is it Good?
AbstractThe effects of bank competition and institutions on credit markets are usually studied separately although both factors are interdependent. We study the effect of bank competition on the choice of contracts (screening versus collateralized credit contract) and explicitly capture the impact of the institutional environment. Most importantly, we show that the effects of bank competition on collateralization, access to finance, and social welfare depend on the institutional environment. We predict that firms' access to credit increases in bank competition if institutions are weak but bank competition does not matter if they are well-developed.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich in its series Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems with number 244.
Date of creation: Jul 2008
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Bank competition; collateralization; screening; incentives;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- K00 - Law and Economics - - General - - - General (including Data Sources and Description)
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-09-13 (All new papers)
- NEP-BAN-2008-09-13 (Banking)
- NEP-BEC-2008-09-13 (Business Economics)
- NEP-COM-2008-09-13 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-CSE-2008-09-13 (Economics of Strategic Management)
- NEP-CTA-2008-09-13 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-LAW-2008-09-13 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2008-09-13 (Microeconomics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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