This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Fragmented property rights and R&D competition

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Derek J. Clark (Department of Economics and Management, University of Tromsø, N-9037 Tromsø, Norway. Derek.Clark@nfh.uit.no)
Kai A. Konrad (WZB, Reichpietschufer 50, D-10785 Berlin, Germany, and Free University of Berlin. kkonrad@wz-berlin.de)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

Where product innovation requires several complementary patents, fragmented property rights can be a factor that limits firms’ willingness to invest in the development and commercialization of new products. This paper studies multiple simultaneous R&D contests for complementary patents and how they interact with patent portfolios that firms may have acquired already. We also consider how this interaction and the intensity of the contests depends on the type of patent trade regimes and the product market equilibria that result from these regimes. We solve for the contest equilibria and show that the multiple patent product involves an important hold-up problem that considerably reduces the overall contest effort.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.sfbtr15.de/dipa/123.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich in its series Discussion Papers with number 123.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: Jun 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:trf:wpaper:123

Contact details of provider:
Postal: D-68131 Mannheim
Fax: +49 621 181-2785
Email:
Web page: http://www.sfbtr15.de/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Claudia Jung).

Related research
Keywords: fragmented property rights; patents; contests; hold-up; R&D; patent pools; licensing;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, 2004. "Efficient Patent Pools," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(3), pages 691-711, June. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Skaperdas, Stergios, 1996. "Contest Success Functions," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 283-90, February.
    Other versions:
  3. Jerry R. Green & Suzanne Scotchmer, 1995. "On the Division of Profit in Sequential Innovation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(1), pages 20-33, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Loury, Glenn C, 1979. "Market Structure and Innovation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 93(3), pages 395-410, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Baye, Michael R. & Hoppe, Heidrun C., 2003. "The strategic equivalence of rent-seeking, innovation, and patent-race games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 217-226, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Vincenzo Denicolò, 2002. "Sequential innovation and the patent-antitrust conflict," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 54(4), pages 649-668, October.
  7. Suzanne Scotchmer, 1996. "Protecting Early Innovators: Should Second-Generation Products Be Patentable?," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(2), pages 322-331, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? IDEAS is not the only service displaying RePEc data. Choose on RePEc which service fits your needs best.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-16.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.