Fragmented property rights and R&D competition
AbstractWhere product innovation requires several complementary patents, fragmented property rights can be a factor that limits firmsâ€™ willingness to invest in the development and commercialization of new products. This paper studies multiple simultaneous R&D contests for complementary patents and how they interact with patent portfolios that firms may have acquired already. We also consider how this interaction and the intensity of the contests depends on the type of patent trade regimes and the product market equilibria that result from these regimes. We solve for the contest equilibria and show that the multiple patent product involves an important hold-up problem that considerably reduces the overall contest effort.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich in its series Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems with number 123.
Date of creation: Jun 2006
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1, D-80539 Munich, Germany
Web page: http://www.sfbtr15.de/
More information through EDIRC
fragmented property rights; patents; contests; hold-up; R&D; patent pools; licensing;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-06-17 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2006-06-17 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-INO-2006-06-17 (Innovation)
- NEP-MIC-2006-06-17 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-TID-2006-06-17 (Technology & Industrial Dynamics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Carl Shapiro, 2004.
"Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools and Standard Setting,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
122247000000000539, David K. Levine.
- Carl Shapiro, 2001. "Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting," NBER Chapters, in: Innovation Policy and the Economy, Volume 1, pages 119-150 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Carl Shapiro, 2003. "Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard-Setting," Law and Economics, EconWPA 0303005, EconWPA.
- Shapiro, Carl, 2000. "Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard-Setting," Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series, Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley qt4hs5s9wk, Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, 2004. "Don't Fence Me In: Fragmented Markets for Technology and the Patent Acquisition Strategies of Firms," Management Science, INFORMS, INFORMS, vol. 50(6), pages 804-820, June.
- Nti, Kofi O, 1997. "Comparative Statics of Contests and Rent-Seeking Games," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 38(1), pages 43-59, February.
- Vincenzo Denicolo, 2002. "Sequential innovation and the patent-antitrust conflict," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 54(4), pages 649-668, October.
- Baye, Michael R. & Hoppe, Heidrun C., 2003. "The strategic equivalence of rent-seeking, innovation, and patent-race games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 217-226, August.
- Skaperdas, Stergios, 1996.
"Contest Success Functions,"
Economic Theory, Springer,
Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 283-90, February.
- Glenn C. Loury, 1976.
"Market Structure and Innovation,"
Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
256, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, 2002.
"Efficient Patent Pools,"
NBER Working Papers
9175, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, 2004. "Efficient Patent Pools," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 94(3), pages 691-711, June.
- Lerner, Josh & Tirole, Jean, 2003. "Efficient Patent Pools," IDEI Working Papers, Institut d'Ãconomie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse 211, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Alexandra Frank).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.