Job Promotion Tournaments and Imperfect Recall
AbstractIn this paper, a promotion tournament is considered, where, at the beginning of the tournament, it is unknown how long the tournament lasts. Further, the promotion decision is based on the assessments of a supervisor with imperfect recall. In line with psychological research, the supervisor is assumed to either value early or recent impressions more strongly. It is shown that effort may increase or decrease, as the probability of promotion in a certain period gets higher. The single effects determining the sign of the effort change oftentimes depend on how the supervisor processes information.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich in its series Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems with number 112.
Date of creation: May 2006
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Promotion Tournament; Promotion Probability; Imperfect Recall;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
- M51 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Personnel Economics - - - Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions
- M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
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