A Hedonic Model of Player Wage Determination from the Indian Premier League Auction#
AbstractA range of cross-sectional models are estimated with a view to establishing the factors that determine the valuation of professional athletes in a highly-specialised sport, with an application to crickets Indian Premier League (IPL). We distinguish between personal characteristic and playing ability factors, and with respect to the former, between ability in different forms of the sport. We find a number of interpretable variables that have explanatory power over auction values, while decomposition according to batting and bowling specialisations produces very different results depending on the use of either Test or One-Day International (ODI) variables. There is also possible evidence of inefficient bidding, insofar that overbidding was somewhat correlated with players with higher realised values.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by School of Economics, La Trobe University in its series Working Papers with number 2010.04.
Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: 2010
Date of revision:
Demand for Sport; Cricket; Auctions; Cross-section Models; Labour Demand;
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C21 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Cross-Sectional Models; Spatial Models; Treatment Effect Models
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
- L83 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Sports; Gambling; Restaurants; Recreation; Tourism
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