Two Comments on the Industrial Organisation of Vertically Related Markets
Abstract
This paper first studies the determination of final consumer price when two successive monopolists bargain over the intermediate goods price. Unlike the conventional double marginalisation result which rests on the (implicit) assumption that the upstream firm has all the bargaining power, it is shown that, as the bargaining power shifts from downstream firm to upstream firm, the equilibrium quantity (price) decreases (increases) continuously from the vertically integrated outcome to the conventional double marginalization outcome. This paper next studies the determination of retail and wholesale prices in successive Cournot oligopolies and generalizes the results of Bresnahan and Reiss (1985) on the ratio of retail to wholesale margins in successive monopolies.Download Info
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Bibliographic Info
Paper provided by School of Economics, La Trobe University in its series Working Papers with number 1998.03.Length: 9 pages
Date of creation: 1998
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:trb:wpaper:1998.03
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Keywords: Monopolies;Other versions of this item:
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Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- ATALLAH, Gamal, 2000.
"Vertical R&D Sprillovers, Cooperation, Market Structure, and Innovation,"
Cahiers de recherche
2000-16, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- Gamal Atallah, 2002. "Vertical R&D Spillovers, Cooperation, Market Structure, and Innovation," Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 11(3), pages 179-209.
- Gamal Atallah, 2000. "Vertical R&D Spillovers, Cooperation, Market Structure, And Innovation," Industrial Organization 0004009, EconWPA.
- Gamal Atallah, 2000. "Vertical R&D Spillovers, Cooperation, Market Structure, and Innovation," CIRANO Working Papers 2000s-54, CIRANO.
- Atallah, G., 2000. "Vertical R&D Sprillovers, Cooperation, Market Structure, and Innovation," Cahiers de recherche 2000-16, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
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