Research Joint Venture and Market Concentration
AbstractThis paper considers the situation where some firms in an industry collude together as an RJV cartel to compete with other firms who individually engage in R&D. The analysis shows that this partial RJV cartelisation may increase market concentration. In comparison with pure R&D competition, where all firms undertake R&D independently, partial RJV cartelisation yields more effective R&D investment, higher profit and social welfare but sometimes it leads to fewer consumer benefits.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by School of Economics, La Trobe University in its series Working Papers with number 1996.11.
Length: 11 pages
Date of creation: 1996
Date of revision:
Market Structure; Oligopolies; Research and Development;
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