In a dynamic model of financial market trading multiple heterogeneously informed traders choose when to place orders. Better informed traders trade immediately, worse informed delay — even though they expect the public expectation to move against them. This behavior causes distinct intra-day patterns with decreasing (L-shaped) spreads and increasing (reverse L-shaped) volume and probability of informed trading (PIN). Competition increases market participation and causes more pronounced spread and less pronounced volume patterns. Systematic improvements in information increase spreads and volume. Very short-lived private information generates L- or reverse J-shaped volume patterns, which are further enhanced by competition.
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Paper provided by University of Toronto, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number
tecipa-365.