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Public Transfers and Domestic Violence: The Roles of Private Information and Spousal Control

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Author Info
Gustavo J Bobonis
Roberto Castro
Melissa Gonzalez-Brenes

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Abstract

Existing economic theories of the family suggest that public transfer programs in which funds are targeted to women, by improving women’s bargaining position in the household, may decrease the incidence of spousal abuse. We study this prediction empirically using data from a unique survey in Mexico to examine the impact of the Oportunidades conditional cash transfer program on spousal abuse rates and threats of violence. We find that although women in beneficiary households are 33 percent less likely to be victims of physical abuse than women in comparable non-beneficiary households, they are more likely to receive violent threats with no associated physical abuse. We re-interpret a model of decision-makers’ interactions with asymmetric information in the male partners’ gains to marriage to document how increases in female partners’ socioeconomic opportunities can lead to an increase in husbands’ use of violent threats with no associated physical abuse – predictions consistent with the empirical evidence.

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File URL: http://repec.economics.utoronto.ca/files/tecipa-362.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Toronto, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number tecipa-362.

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Length: 44 pages
Date of creation: 09 Jul 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:tor:tecipa:tecipa-362

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Related research
Keywords: spousal abuse; conditional cash transfer programs; non-cooperative bargaining;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs

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    Other versions:
  2. Habiba Djebbari, 2005. "The Impact on Nutrition of the Intrahousehold Distribution of Power," IZA Discussion Papers 1701, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
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    Other versions:
  7. Udry, Christopher, 1996. "Gender, Agricultural Production, and the Theory of the Household," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(5), pages 1010-46, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Shelly Lundberg & Robert Pollak, 2003. "Efficiency in Marriage," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 1(3), pages 153-167, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Gustavo J. Bobonis, 2009. "Is the Allocation of Resources within the Household Efficient? New Evidence from a Randomized Experiment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 117(3), pages 453-503, 06. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    Other versions:
  12. Farmer, Amy & Tiefenthaler, Jill, 1997. "An Economic Analysis of Domestic Violence," Review of Social Economy, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 55(3), pages 337-58, Fall.
  13. Stefan Dercon & Pramila Krishnan, 2000. "In Sickness and in Health: Risk Sharing within Households in Rural Ethiopia," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(4), pages 688-727, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  16. Helen V. Tauchen & Ann Dryden Witte & Sharon K. Long, 1991. "Domestic Violence: A Non-random Affair," NBER Working Papers 1665, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  18. Pierre-Andre Chiappori & Bernard Fortin & Guy Lacroix, 2002. "Marriage Market, Divorce Legislation, and Household Labor Supply," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(1), pages 37-72, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  19. M. Browning & P. A. Chiappori, 1998. "Efficient Intra-Household Allocations: A General Characterization and Empirical Tests," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(6), pages 1241-1278, November.
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  20. repec:bep:eapcon:v:8:y:2008:i:1:p:1766-1766 is not listed on IDEAS
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