How does the marriage market clear? An empirical framework
AbstractThe paper surveys the Choo Siow (CS) marriage matching model and its extensions. CS derives a behavioral marriage matching function. The collective model of intra-household allocations can be integrated into this framework. Spousal labor supplies respond to changing marriage market conditions. Marriage market tightness, the ratio of unmarried type i men to unmarried type j women is a sufficient statistic for marriage market conditions for those types of individuals. The hypothesis that spousal labor supplies vary to equilibrate the marriage market has overidentifying restrictions. The framework extends to a dynamic marriage matching environment. Empirically, this paper shows how the famine caused by the great leap forward in Sichuan affected the marital behavior of famine born cohorts. Marriage market tightness is shown to be a useful statistic for summarizing marriage market conditions in the United States. Marriage market conditions in the contemporary United States primarily affect spousal labor force participation rather than hours of work.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Toronto, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number tecipa-322.
Length: 63 pages
Date of creation: 12 Jul 2008
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marriage; matching; collective model;
Other versions of this item:
- Aloysius Siow, 2008. "How does the marriage market clear? An empirical framework," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 41(4), pages 1121-1155, November.
- J - Labor and Demographic Economics
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-07-30 (All new papers)
- NEP-LAB-2008-07-30 (Labour Economics)
- NEP-LTV-2008-07-30 (Unemployment, Inequality & Poverty)
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- J. Emery & Ana Ferrer, 2009. "Marriage market imbalances and labor force participation of Canadian women," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 43-57, March.
- Eugene Choo & Shannon Seitz & Aloysius Siow, 2008.
"The Collective Marriage Matching Model: Identification, Estimation and Testing,"
tecipa-340, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- Shannon Seitz & Aloysius Siow & Eugene Choo, 2010. "The Collective Marriage Matching Model: Identification, Estimation and Testing," 2010 Meeting Papers 267, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Eugene Choo & Shannon Seitz & Aloysuis Siow, 2008. "The Collective Marriage Matching Model: Identification, Estimation and Testing," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 704, Boston College Department of Economics.
- Aloysius Siow, 2009. "Testing Becker's Theory of Positive Assortative Matching," Working Papers tecipa-356, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
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