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Search Theory; Current Perspectives

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Author Info
Shouyong Shi

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Abstract

In this article I briefly review recent developments in search theory. Particular attention is given to the framework of directed search. I first illustrate the inefficiency that arises in the equilibrium of standard (undirected) search models. Then I provide a formulation of directed search and show that the resulting equilibrium eliminates the inefficiency. Examples of directed search with price posting and auction are provided both for the market with a finite number of individuals and for a large market. After describing the application of search models in monetary theory, I conclude with a remark on the future research.

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File URL: http://repec.economics.utoronto.ca/files/tecipa-273-1.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Toronto, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number tecipa-273.

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Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: 12 Dec 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:tor:tecipa:tecipa-273

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Related research
Keywords: Search; Efficiency; Unemployment;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
E10 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General Aggregative Models - - - General

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  1. Edward J. Green & Ruilin Zhou, 2005. "Money As A Mechanism In A Bewley Economy," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 46(2), pages 351-371, 05. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Shouyong Shi, 1995. "Money and Prices: A Model of Search and Bargaining," Working Papers 916, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
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  3. Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro & Wright, Randall, 1993. "A Search-Theoretic Approach to Monetary Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(1), pages 63-77, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Hosios, Arthur J, 1990. "On the Efficiency of Matching and Related Models of Search and Unemployment," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 57(2), pages 279-98, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Shi, Shouyong, 2001. "Frictional Assignment. I. Efficiency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 98(2), pages 232-260, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Kenneth Burdett & Shouyong Shi & Randall Wright, 2001. "Pricing and Matching with Frictions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(5), pages 1060-1085, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Peter Diamond, 1985. "Search Theory," Working papers 389, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  8. Robert Shimer & Lones Smith, 2000. "Assortative Matching and Search," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(2), pages 343-370, March.
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  9. Daron Acemoglu & Robert Shimer, 1999. "Efficient Unemployment Insurance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(5), pages 893-928, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Trejos, Alberto & Wright, Randall, 1995. "Search, Bargaining, Money, and Prices," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(1), pages 118-41, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Peters, Michael, 1991. "Ex Ante Price Offers in Matching Games Non-steady States," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(5), pages 1425-54, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Moen, Espen R, 1997. "Competitive Search Equilibrium," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(2), pages 385-411, April.
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  13. Benoit Julien & John Kennes & Ian King, 2000. "Bidding for Labor," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 3(4), pages 619-649, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  14. Sattinger, Michael, 1995. "Search and the Efficient Assignment of Workers to Jobs," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 36(2), pages 283-302, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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